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《中歐全面投資協定》主要條款(全文)

2020-12-31 14:13

來源: 一瓣 作者: 陳達飛

編者按:《中歐全面投資協定》(CAI)談判完成,等待簽署、生效。CAI的主要內容與歐盟在2018年提出的WTO改革方案有較大交集,如“競爭中性”、市場準入、透明度要求、國有企業、爭端解決機制、強制性技術轉讓等等。由于WTO改革陷入僵局,CAI可被理解為“另起爐灶”,但CAI與WTO并非替代關系,而是互補的。據媒體報道可知,當前雙方各執爭議的主要領域是勞工條款,而從拜登執政綱領可知,這將是美方最為關切的領域。在中歐達成協議的前提下,美方的最優行為也將是與中國談判。中國已經先發優勢,也將在談判桌上更有底氣。


Key elements of the EU-China ComprehensiveAgreement on Investment
歐盟-中國全面投資協定的主要內容(CAI)
 
The cumulative EU foreign direct investment(FDI) flows from the EU to China over the last 20 years have reached more than €140 billion. For Chinese FDI into the EU the figure is almost €120 billion. EU FDI in China remains relatively modest with respect to the size and the potential of the Chinese economy.
在過去的20年里,歐盟對中國的外國直接投資(FDI)累計達到1400多億歐元。就中國對歐盟的外國直接投資而言,這一數字接近1200億歐元。相對于中國經濟的規模和潛力,歐盟在中國的外國直接投資仍然相對較小。
 
As regards investment, the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) will be the most ambitious agreement that China has ever concluded with a third country. In addition torules against the forced transfer of technologies, CAI will also be the first agreement to deliver on obligations for the behavior of state-owned enterprises, comprehensive transparency rules for subsidies and commitments related to sustainable development.
在投資方面,歐盟-中國全面投資協定(CAI)將是有史以來中國與第三國簽訂的最雄心勃勃的協定。除了禁止強行性技術轉讓之外,CAI還將是第一份履行國有企業行為義務、全面透明補貼規則和可持續發展承諾的協議。
 
The CAI will ensure that EU investors achieve better access to a fast growing 1.4 billion consumer market, and thatthey compete on a better level playing field in China. This is important forthe global competitiveness and the future growth of EU industry.
CAI將確保歐盟投資者更好地進入快速增長的14億消費者市場,并確保他們在中國有更好的公平競爭環境。這對歐盟工業的全球競爭力和未來增長非常重要。
 
Ambitious opening by China to Europeaninvestments
中國向歐洲投資開放的雄心
 
Firstly, the CAI binds China's liberalisation of investments over the last 20 years and, in that way, it prevents backsliding. This makes the conditions of market access for EU companies clear and independent of China's internal policies. It also allowsthe EU to resort to the dispute resolution mechanism in CAI in case of breach of commitments.
首先,CAI鞏固了中國過去20年投資自由化的成就,并以此防止倒退。這使得歐盟企業的市場準入條件得以明確,不再受到中國內部政策的影響。同時,也允許歐盟在(中方)違反承諾的情況下,訴諸CAI的爭端解決機制。
 
In addition, the EU has negotiated furtherand new market access openings and commitments such as the elimination of quantitative restrictions, equity caps or joint venture requirements in a number of sectors. These are restrictions that severely hamper the activities of our companies in China. The overall package is far more ambitious than what China has committed to before.
此外,歐盟還談判達成了進一步的、新的市場開放和準入承諾,如取消一些行業的數量限制、股權上限或合資要求。這些限制嚴重阻礙了歐盟企業在中國的活動。整體方案遠比中國之前所承諾的要雄心勃勃。
 
On the EU side, the market is already openand largely committed for services sectors under the General Agreement on Tradein Services (GATS). EU sensitivities, such as in the field of energy, agriculture, fisheries, audio-visual, public services, etc. are all preserved in CAI.
歐盟方面,根據《服務貿易總協定》(GATS),市場已經開放,并在很大程度上對服務行業做出了承諾。歐盟敏感的領域,如能源、農業、漁業、視聽、公共服務等領域,都在CAI中得以保留。
 
Examples of market access commitments by China:
中國市場準入承諾的例子
 
Manufacturing: China has made comprehensive commitments with only very limited exclusions (in particular, in sectors withsignificant overcapacity). In terms of the level of ambition, this would matchthe EU's openness. Roughly half of EU FDI is in the manufacturing sector (e.g.transport and telecommunication equipment, chemicals, health equipment etc.). China has not made such far-reaching market access commitments with any other partner.
制造業:中國已經做出了全面的承諾,只排除了非常有限的行業(特別是在產能嚴重過剩的行業)。就雄心程度而言,這將與歐盟的開放度相匹配。大約一半的歐盟外國直接投資是在制造業部門(如運輸和電信設備、化學品、衛生設備等)。中國還沒有與任何其他伙伴就市場準入作出如此深遠的承諾。
 
Automotive sector: China has agreed to remove and phase out joint venture requirements. China will commit market access for new energy vehicles.
汽車部門:中國已同意取消并逐步取消合資企業的要求。中國將承諾新能源汽車的市場準入。
 
Financial services: China had already started the process of gradually liberalising the financial services sector and will grant and commit to keep that opening to EU investors. Joint venture requirements and foreign equity caps have been removed for banking, trading insecurities and insurance (including reinsurance), as well as asset management.
金融服務業:中國已經開始漸進放開金融服務業的市場化進程,并將同意并承諾保持對歐盟投資者的開放。在銀行業、證券交易和保險(包括再保險)以及資產管理領域,對合資企業的要求和外資股本上限已被取消。
 
Health (private hospitals): China will offer new market opening by lifting joint venture requirements for private hospitals in key Chinese cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjian, Guangzhou and Shenzhen .
健康(民營醫院):中國將開放新的市場,在北京、上海、天津、廣州和深圳等重點城市取消民營醫院的合資要求。
 
R&D (biological resources): China has not previously committed openness to foreign investment in R&D inbiological resources. China has agreed not to introduce new restrictions and to give to the EU any lifting of current restrictions in this area that may happen in the future.
研發(生物資源):中國在生物資源研發領域從未對外資開放。中方已同意不采取新的限制措施,并將在未來可能發生的情況下,解除現有的限制措施給予歐盟。
 
Telecommunication/Cloud services: China has agreed to lift the investment ban for cloud services. They will now be open to EU investors subject to a 50% equity cap.
電信/云服務:中國已同意取消對云服務的投資禁令。它們現在將向歐盟投資者開放,但股權上限為50%。
 
Computer services: China has agreed to bind market access for computer services - a significant improvement from thecurrent situation. Also, China will include a ‘technology neutrality' clause, which would ensure that equity caps imposed for value-added telecom services will not be applied to other services such as financial, logistics, medicaletc. if offered online.
計算機服務:中國已同意限制(收緊)計算機服務的市場準入,這比目前的情況有了很大的改善。此外,中國還將包括一項“技術中立”條款,該條款將確保對增值電信服務設置的股權上限不會適用于金融、物流、醫療等在線服務。
 
International maritime transport: China will allow investment in the relevant land-based auxiliary activities, enabling EU companies to invest without restriction in cargo-handling, container depotsand stations, maritime agencies, etc. This will allow EU companies to organisea full range of multi-modal door-to-door transport, including the domestic legof international maritime transport.
國際海運:中方將允許對相關陸基輔助活動進行投資,使歐盟企業在貨物裝卸、集裝箱堆場和碼頭、海事機構等方面的投資不受限制。這將使歐盟公司能夠組織全方位的多式門到門運輸,包括國際海運的國內分支。
 
Air transport-related services: While the CAI does not address traffic rights because they are subject to separateaviation agreements, China will open up in the key areas of computer reservation systems, ground handling and selling and marketing services. China has alsoremoved its minimum capital requirement for rental and leasing of aircraft without crew, going beyond GATS.
航空運輸相關服務: 雖然CAI沒有涉及交通權,因為它們受單獨的航空協議的約束,但中國將開放計算機預訂系統、地面處理和銷售和營銷服務等關鍵領域。中國還取消了租賃和無機組飛機的最低資本要求,超出了《服務貿易總協定》。
 
Business services: China will eliminate joint venture requirements in real estate services, rental and leasing services, repair and maintenance for transport, advertising, market research, management consulting and translation services, etc.
商業服務:中國將取消在房地產服務、租賃服務、交通維修、廣告、市場調查、管理咨詢和翻譯服務等方面的合資要求。
 
Environmental services: China will remove joint venture requirements in environmental services such as sewage, noiseabatement, solid waste disposal, cleaning of exhaust gases, nature and landscape protection, sanitations and other environmental services.
環境服務:中國將取消環境服務方面的合資要求,如污水處理、噪音消減、固體廢物處理、廢氣凈化、自然和景觀保護、衛生和其他環境服務。
 
Construction services: China will eliminate the project limitations currently reserved in their GATS commitments.
建設服務:中國將取消目前在其《服務貿易總協定》承諾中保留的項目限制。
 
Employees of EU investors: Managers and specialists of EU companies will be allowed to work up to three years inChinese subsidiaries, without restrictions such as labour market tests orquotas. Representatives of EU investors will be allowed to visit freely prior to making an investment.
歐盟投資者的雇員:歐盟企業的經理和專家將被允許在中國子公司工作至多3年,不受勞動力市場測試或配額等限制。歐盟投資者的代表將被允許在投資前自由訪問。
 
Improving level playing field – makinginvestment fairer
改善公平競爭環境,促進投資更加公平
 
State owned enterprises (SOEs) - Chinese SOEs contribute to around 30 percent of the country's GDP. CAI seeks todiscipline the behaviour of SOEs by requiring them to act in accordance with commercial considerations and not to discriminate in their purchases and sales of goods or services. Importantly, China also undertakes the obligation toprovide, upon request, specific information to allow for the assessment of whether the behaviour of a specific enterprise complies with the agreed the CAIobligations. If the problem goes unresolved, we can resort to disputere solution under the CAI.
國有企業:中國的國有企業貢獻了大約30%的國內生產總值。CAI旨在規范國有企業的行為,要求它們根據商業規范行事,在購買和銷售商品或服務時不得歧視。重要的是,中國還承擔應要求提供具體信息的義務,以便評估特定企業的行為是否符合雙方商定的“CAI義務”。如果問題無法解決,我們可以在CAI下訴諸爭端解決機制。
 
Transparency in subsidies – The CAI fill sone important gap in the WTO rulebook by imposing transparency obligations onsubsidies in the services sectors. Also, the CAI obliges China to engage inconsultations in order to provide additional information on subsidies that could have a negative effect on the investment interests of the EU. China isalso obliged to engage in consultations with a view to seek to address such negative effects.
補貼的透明度:CAI對服務業補貼規定了透明度義務,填補了WTO規則手冊中的一個重要空白。此外,CAI要求中國(與歐盟)進行磋商,以提供可能對歐盟投資利益產生負面影響的額外補貼信息。中國也有義務進行磋商,以尋求解決這些負面影響。
 
Forced technology transfers – The CAI lays very clear rules against the forced transfer of technology. The provisions consist of the prohibition of several types of investment requirements that compel transfer of technology, such as requirements to transfer technology to ajoint venture partner, as well as prohibitions to interfere in contractual freedom in technology licencing. These rules would also include disciplines onthe protection of confidential business information collected by administrative bodies (for instance in the process of certification of a good or a service)from unauthorised disclosure. The agreed rules significantly enhance the disciplines in WTO.
強制技術轉讓:CAI制定了非常明確的規則,反對強制轉讓技術。這些規定包括禁止幾類迫使轉讓技術的投資要求,例如要求向合資伙伴轉讓技術,以及禁止干涉技術許可方面的合同自由。這些規則還將包括關于保護行政機構(例如在商品或服務的認證過程中)收集的機密商業信息未經授權不準披露的紀律。商定的規則大大加強了世貿組織的紀律。
 
Standard setting, authorisations, transparency – This agreement covers other longstanding EU industry requests. China will provide equal access to standard setting bodies for our companies.China will also enhance transparency, predictability and fairness inauthorisations. The CAI will include transparency rules for regulatory andadministrative measures to enhance legal certainty and predictability, as wellas for procedural fairness and the right to judicial review, including incompetition cases.
標準設置、授權、透明度:該協議還涵蓋了歐盟行業的其他長期要求。中國將為我們的企業提供參與標準制定的平等機會。中國還將提高授權的透明度、可預見性和公平性。CAI將包括監管和行政措施的透明度規則,以提高法律的確定性和可預見性,以及程序公平和獲得司法審查的權利,包括競爭案件。
 
Embedding sustainable development in ourinvestment relationship
將可持續發展嵌入我們的投資關系
 
In contrast to other agreements concluded by China, the CAI binds the parties into a value based investment relationship grounded on sustainable development principles. The relevant provisions are subject to a specifically tailored implementation mechanism to address differences with a high degree of transparency and participation of civil society.
與中國簽訂的其他協議不同的是,該協議將各方約束在基于可持續發展原則的價值投資關系中。相關條款受制于一個專門的執行機制,以在高透明度和民間社會的參與下解決分歧。
 
China commits, in the areas of labour and environment, not to lower the standards of protection in order to attract investment, not to use labour and environment standards for protectionist purposes, as well as to respect its international obligations in the relevanttreaties. China will support the uptake of corporate social responsibility byits companies.
在勞工和環境領域,中國承諾不降低保護標準以吸引投資,不將勞工和環境標準用于保護主義目的,尊重在有關條約中承擔的國際義務。中國將支持企業承擔社會責任。
 
Importantly, the CAI also includescommitments on environment and climate, including to effectively implement theParis Agreement on climate.
重要的是,CAI還包括環境和氣候方面的承諾,包括有效實施《巴黎氣候協定》。
 
China also commits to working towards the ratification of the outstanding ILO (International Labour Organisation)fundamental Conventions and takes specific commitments in relation to the two ILO fundamental Conventions on forced labour that it has not ratified yet.
中國還承諾致力于批準《國際勞工組織基本公約》,并對尚未批準的《國際勞工組織關于強迫勞動的兩項基本公約》作出具體承諾。
 
Monitoring of implementation and disputesettlement
監督執行和爭端解決
 
In the CAI, China agrees to an enforcement mechanism (state-to-state dispute settlement), as in our trade agreements.
在CAI中,中國同意建立一種執行機制(國家間爭端解決機制),就像我們的貿易協定一樣。
 
This will be coupled with a monitoringmechanism at pre-litigation phase established at political level, which will allow us to raise problems as they arise (including via an urgency procedure).
這將與在政治層面建立的訴訟前階段的監測機制相結合,使我們能夠在問題出現時提出問題(包括通過緊急程序)。

附:歐盟WTO改革方案(2018年)

This paper is intended to serve as a basis fordiscussion with the European Parliament, the Council and with other Members of the WTO, in response tothe conclusions of the European Council of 28 June 2018, which invitedthe European Commission to propose a comprehensive approach to improving together with like-minded partners, the functioning of the WTO in crucial areas, including thedispute settlement and the Appellate Body in particular. It is withoutprejudice to the final position of the European Commission on the mattersdescribed within.
 
本文的目的是為一個與歐洲議會進行討論的打基礎。針對2018年6月28日歐洲理事會的結論,安理會和其他世貿組織的成員邀請歐盟委員會與志同道合的伙伴一起,提出一個全面的方法來改善世貿組織在關鍵領域的功能,特別是爭端解決機制和上訴機構。它不妨礙歐洲委員會關于其中所述事項的最后立場。

一、歐盟提案簡介
 
The European Council of 28-29 June 2018 gave theCommission a mandate to pursue WTO modernisation in pursuit of the objectivesof making the WTO more relevant and adaptive to a changing world, andstrengthening the WTO's effectiveness.
 
2018年6月28日至29日,歐洲理事會授權歐盟委員會推動世貿組織現代化,以實現世貿組織貼近現實和適應不斷變化的世界的目標,以及加強世貿組織的效力。
 
The EU remains a staunch supporter of the multilateraltrading system and firmly believes that the WTO is indispensable in ensuringfree and fair trade. The multilateral system has provided the basis for therapid growth of economies around the world and for the lifting of hundreds ofmillions of people out of poverty. It has been the guarantor of trade at timesof growing tensions and the backbone of the international system of economicgovernance. Even at a time of the harshest economic conditions during the greatrecession, it has helpedavert recourse to the trade wars that have fuelled economic decline in thepast. As such the health and centrality of the multilateral system needs to bepreserved. Its marginalisation, weakening and decline have to be prevented at all costs.
 
歐盟仍是多邊貿易體制的堅定支持者,堅信世貿組織是確保自由和公平貿易不可或缺的組織。多邊體系為世界各國經濟的迅速增長和數億人擺脫貧困提供了基礎。在國際局勢日益緊張時,它一直是貿易的保護者,是國際經濟治理體系的支柱。即使在大衰退期間經濟狀況最糟糕的時候,它也有助于避免過去導致經濟衰退的貿易戰。因此,我們需要維護多邊體系的健康運行和中心地位,不惜一切代價防止它的邊緣化、削弱和衰落傾向。
 
Unfortunately,the rules-based multilateral trading system is facingits deepest crisis since its inception. For the first time, the basictenets of the WTO, both insetting the essential rules and structure for international trade and indelivering the most effective and developed dispute settlement mechanism of anymultilateral organisation,are threatened.
 
不幸地是,以規則為基礎的多邊貿易體系正面臨自建立以來最嚴重的危機。世貿組織在制定國際貿易基本規則和結構,以及向任何多邊組織提供最有效和最發達的爭端解決機制方面的基本原則也首次受到威脅。
 
The crisis is set to deepen further in the comingmonths, as moreunilateral measures are threatened and imposed, leading, in some cases, to countermeasures, or to mercantilist deals. In parallel, as moreAppellate Body members leave office while the new appointments are beingblocked, the disputesettlement system will soon fall into paralysis, rendering enforcement of the rules impossible. Thatwould equate to a 20-year step backward in global economic governance. It wouldmean going back to a trading environment where rules are only enforced whereconvenient and where strength replaces rules as the basis for trade relations.
 
未來幾個月,隨著更多單邊措施的制定和強加,反制措施和重商主義也會行為也會興起,WTO的危機將進一步深化。與此同時,隨著越來越多的上訴機構成員離職和新任命成員尚未就位,爭端解決機制將很快陷入癱瘓,這些規則將無法得到執行。這相當于全球經濟治理倒退了20年,意味著世界將退回到另一種貿易環境。在這種環境中,規則只能在方便的情況下執行,而實力將取代規則,成為貿易關系的基礎。
 
This development constitutes a major risk for the EU, both for thestability of the political order and for the sustainability of economic growth.The EU economy is highly integrated with global value chains and depends onpredictable, rules-basedinternational trade for both imports and exports.
 
這一事態發展對歐盟構成重大風險,對政治秩序的穩定和經濟增長的可持續性都是如此。歐盟經濟與全球價值鏈高度融合,對可預測的、基于規則的進出口貿易高度依賴。
 
For this reason, there is an urgent need to move the current debate ona positive path focusing on the modernisation of the WTO. It is clear that 23years after the creation of the organisation and the conclusion of the UruguayRound, themultilateral system is in need of change. While the broader WTO membership mayhave different views regarding the particularities of this change, it isunquestionable that a discussion needs to take place on the question of how tomake the WTO relevant again.
 
因此,迫切需要將當前的辯論轉向一條聚焦于WTO現代化的積極道路。很明顯,在本組織成立和烏拉圭回合談判結束23年之后,多邊體系需要改變。雖然不同的世貿組織成員對這一變化的特點可能有不同的看法,但毫無疑問的是,我們需要就如何使世貿組織重新具有意義的問題進行討論。
 
For the EU, the current crisis and the ongoing marginalisation ofthe WTO have their roots in the inefficiencies of the current system. The WTO'snegotiating function has not been able to deliver any significant improvementsin the trade rulebook apart from the agreements reached on Trade Facilitationand Export Competition. The system remains blocked by an antiquated approach toflexibilities which allows over 2/3 of the membership including the world'slargest and most dynamic economies to claim special treatment. The WTO'smonitoring function is crippled by ineffective and repetitive committeeprocedures which are based on insufficient transparency. And, the core ofthe dispute settlement system is being challenged, with the distinct possibility of its paralysis in thenear term. These problems are compounded by the broader geo-strategic developments.In essence, since 1995 theworld has changed;the WTO has not.
 
對歐盟來說,當前的危機和世貿組織不斷被邊緣化的根源在于當前體系的低效率。除了在貿易便利化和出口競爭方面達成的協議外,世貿組織的談判職能一直未能在貿易規則方面取得任何重大改善。該體系仍然受到過時的便捷化方法的阻礙,它允許超過三分之二的成員國(包括世界上最大、最具活力的經濟體)所要求的特殊待遇。世貿組織的監督職能因不夠透明的委員會程序而變得無效或低效。而且,爭端解決機制的核心正在受到挑戰,它在短期內就有可能癱瘓。這些問題由于更廣泛的地緣戰略發展而變得更加復雜。實際上,自1995年以來,世界發生了變化,但世貿組織沒有。
 
In this broader context, the EU believes that a modernisation of the WTO isurgently needed. The following three papers covering:(1)rulemaking anddevelopment;(2)regular work and transparency;and(3) disputesettlement set out the direction of a possible modernisation effort.
 
在這種背景下,歐盟認為,迫切需要推動WTO的現代化:(1)規章制定與發展;(2)常規性工作和透明度;(3)為可能的現代化方向制定爭端解決機制;

二、歐盟關于規則制定的建議


Background/背景
 
The European Council of 28-29 June 2018 gave theCommission a mandate to pursue WTO modernisation in pursuit of the objectivesof (1) making the WTOmore relevant and adaptive to a changing world, and (2) strengthening the WTO's effectiveness. Modernising theWTO’s rulemaking activities form the central pillar of this process.
 
2018年6月28日至29日,歐洲理事會授權歐盟委員會實施世貿組織現代化,以實現以下目標:(1)提高世貿組織的相關性和適應性;(2)提高世貿組織的有效性。世貿組織規則制定議程的現代化是這一進程的核心支柱。
 
Broader contextand the focus of EU efforts
背景和歐盟努力的重點
 
The WTO also has the objective of facilitatingrulemaking. Unfortunately, this has only materialised to a very limited extent.Despite an institutional structure designed to help advance discussions, the WTO’snegotiating function has largely been blocked and is now effectively paralysed.There are multiple reasons for this situation including, in particular, divergentinterests, the extremedifficulty in arriving at consensus decisions by all 164 Members and thecurrent approach on development. In this context, any modernisation discussion has to cover both thesubstantive side and the process side of negotiations.
 
世貿組織的目標包括促進規則的制定。不幸的是,這個目標只在非常有限的程度上實現了。盡管WTO的制度結構旨在幫助推進討論,但它的談判職能的發揮在很大程度上受到了抑制,目前實際上已陷入癱瘓。造成這種狀況的原因有很多,特別是利益分歧——使164個成員國達成協商一致的決定極為困難。在這方面,任何現代化方案都必須包括談判職能的實質和流程兩個方面。
 
Overallobjective for modernization
現代化的整體目標
 
The objective is to update the rules and to create theconditions for the rules to be updated.
目標是更新規則并為規則的更新創造條件。
 
Substance:address issues that are key toglobal trade as it evolves.
實質:隨著全球貿易的發展,解決對全球貿易至關重要的問題。
 
Process:move the organisation towards amodel of negotiations where individual issues can be built up by interestedMembers under the auspices of the WTO toward eventual agreement by some or allMembers forming integral part of the WTO framework .
過程:使組織朝著有助于談判的模式邁進。在此模式下,由世貿組織的主持,有興趣的成員國可提出相關問題,最終由世貿組織的部分或所有成員國達成協議。
 
(一)Proposals for future rulemakingactivities in the WTO
未來關于世貿組織規則制定活動的建議
 
While the EU should continue to pursue the issues thatform part of the existing Doha mandate, there is an urgent need to broaden the negotiatingagenda with the objective of creating rules that:rebalance the system and level the playing field;address market access, discrimination and regulatory barriers in all sectorsof the economy;and strengthen the contribution oftrade to addressing the sustainability objectives of the global community. Thisshould build upon a number of initiatives already launched in Buenos Aires toreduce the costs of trade and go together with a broader reflection ondevelopment.
 
盡管歐盟應繼續推動多哈談判授權的部分問題,但更為迫切的是拓展談判議程,制定規則以:重新平衡體系,推動公平競爭;解決所有經濟部門的市場準入、歧視和監管障礙;強化貿易對實現全球的可持續性目標的貢獻。這些目標,應建立在布宜諾斯艾利斯已經采取的一些行動的基礎上,旨在降低貿易成本,同時對發展問題進行更廣泛的思考。
 
A. Creatingrules that rebalance the system and level the playing field
制定規則,平衡系統,實現公平競爭
 
Economic operators in a number of countriesincreasingly benefit from targeted and significant market-distorting governmentsupport that is often channelled through state-owned enterprises. While theprovision of industrial subsidies can in certain cases constitute a legitimatepolicy tool, their use mayalso carry significant risks for global trade as they can disrupt productionprocesses, affectbusiness performance and skew the competitive field. The Agreement on Subsidiesand Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) is the main tool for disciplining industrialsubsidies. However, it has not been as effective as necessary to curtailcertain practices that have emerged in recent years. Indeed, itsapplication has revealed a number of gaps and ambiguities that need to beaddressed as a matter of urgency.
 
有些國家的經濟經營者越來越多地受益于有針對性的、嚴重扭曲市場的政府支持措施,這些政府支持措施通常通過國有企業來提供。雖然在某些情況下,提供工業補貼可以構成一種合法的政策工具,但它們的使用也可能給全球貿易帶來重大風險,因為它們可能擾亂生產過程,影響企業業績,并扭曲市場競爭?!堆a貼與反補貼措施協定》(SCM協定)是約束產業補貼的主要工具。然而,限制近年來出現的某些做法并沒有達到預期的效果。事實上,在SCM的執行過程中,揭示了一些需要作為緊急事項加以處理的漏洞和含糊不清之處。

In this contextthe EU should pursue the following proposals aimed at disciplining the use ofindustrial subsidies and the activities of state-owned enterprises.
 
在這方面,歐盟應執行下列建議,以產業補貼的使用和國有企業的活動。
 
1. Improvetransparency and subsidy notifications
增強補貼的透明度
 
The lack of comprehensive information on subsidiesprovided by Members is one of the biggest shortcomings in the application ofthe current system. Although the SCM Agreement already requires Members tonotify their subsidies, the level of compliance is poor and has deterioratedin recent years, to the extentthat as of end of March 2018 over half of the membership (90 Members) had not madeany notification1. Yet, without transparency in subsidies, Members cannotreview each other's actions and face significant obstacles in seekingenforcement of the rules. This greatly weakens the value of the substantivedisciplines.
 
缺乏關于成員國提供補貼的全面信息是現行制度在執行過程中的最大缺點之一。盡管供應鏈管理協議已經要求成員國通知其補貼,但遵守協議的程度較低,而且近年來有所惡化。截至2018年3月底,超過一半的成員(90名成員)沒有發出任何通知。然而,如果補貼不透明,成員國就無法相互審查對方的行動,在尋求執行規則方面也面臨重大障礙。這大大削弱了規則的價值。
 
The rulemaking in this area should focus on creatingincentives for WTO Members to fully comply with their notification obligations.The EU has already identified ways to improve transparency and subsidynotificationn, for example, the creationof a general rebuttable presumption according to which if a subsidy is notnotified or is counter-notified, it would be presumed to be a subsidy or even bepresumed to be a subsidy causing serious prejudice.
 
規則制定重點應該為WTO成員國充分履行其通知義務創造激勵。歐盟已經確定了提高透明度和補貼通知的方法,例如,建立一個可反駁的一般推定,據此,如果補貼沒有被通知或被反通知,它將被推定為補貼,甚至被推定為造成嚴重損害的補貼。
 
2. Better capture SOEs
更好的覆蓋國企
 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are, in a number of countries, an instrument through which the state decisivelygoverns and influences the economy, often with market distortive effects. However, the growth andinfluence of SOEs in recent years is not yet matched with equivalentdisciplines to capture any market-distorting behaviour under the current rules.
 
在許多國家,國有企業是國家管理和影響經濟的工具,常常產生市場扭曲效應。然而,現行規則與近年來國有企業的增長和影響力不匹配,無法捕捉到任何扭曲市場的行為。
 
Subsidies granted to SOEs are already captured by theSCM Agreement, in the sameway as any other subsidy granted by the state. With regard to instances whereSOEs themselves grant subsidies, the SCM Agreement captures them through the concept ofa "public body". However, this has been interpreted in a rather narrow manner, which allows aconsiderable number of SOEs to escape the application of the SCM Agreement. TheEU therefore should propose a clarification of what constitutes a public body, on the basisof a case by case analysis to determine whether a state-owned or astate-controlled enterprise performs a government function or furthers agovernment policy, as well as howto assess whether a Member exercises meaningful control over the enterprise inquestion.
 
對國有企業的補貼已經在《SCM協定》中得到了體現,就像國家給予的任何其他補貼一樣。對于國有企業自己提供補貼的例子,《供應鏈管理協議》通過“公共機構”的概念對其進行了闡述。然而,這種解釋相當呆板,使得相當多的國有企業得以避開供應鏈管理協議的約束。因此,歐盟應該澄清什么是公共機構,通過一個一個的案例分析,來確定國有或國有控股企業是否在履行政府職能或推進政府政策,以及如何評估成員國是否對相關企業擁有實質性控制權。
 
In addition, the EU should propose rules capturing othermarket-distorting support provided by SOEs when used as vehicles to pursuegovernment economic policies rather than focusing on their own economicperformance, includinginter alia, transparencywith regard to the level and degree of state control in SOEs.
 
此外,歐盟應提出規則,以考察政府利用國有企業作為工具以執行政府經濟政策所造成的其它扭曲市場的行為,而不是關注國有企業自身的經濟表現,包括國家對國有企業控制水平和程度方面的透明度。
 
3.Capture more effectively the mosttrade-distortive types of subsidies
更有效地識別對貿易扭曲程度最高的補貼類型
 
The SCM Agreement provides for two categories ofprohibited subsidies, namely subsidies contingent upon export performanceand subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods. Allother subsidies are actionable:they are permissible, unless the complaining country shows that the subsidyhad an adverse effect on its trade interests. However, the latter isquite often a challenging exercise and therefore a number of egregious types ofsubsidies that heavily distort international trade, such as thosecontributing to the overcapacity plaguing several sectors of the economy, cannot becaptured sufficiently under the current rules.
 
《SCM協定》禁止了兩類補貼:依據出口額提供的補貼和根據使用國產商品相教于進口商品的補貼。所有其他補貼都是可操作的:它們是允許的,除非一國表明補貼對其貿易利益產生了不利影響。然而,這往往是一項具有挑戰性的工作,因此,許多令人震驚的嚴重扭曲國際貿易補貼類型在現行規則下是無法充分體現的,例如那些導致產能過剩,從而困擾多個經濟部門的補貼。


The rulemaking in this area should aim at subjectingthe most harmful types of subsidies that are in principle permissible under thecurrent rules to stricter rules. This could be achieved for example by expandingthe list of prohibited subsidies or by creating a rebuttable presumption ofserious prejudice similar to the lapsed Article 6(1) of the SCM Agreement. Types of subsidies that could besubject to such stricter rules include, for example, unlimited guarantees, subsidies given to an insolvent or ailing enterprisewith no credible restructuring plan or dual pricing.
 
該領域的規則制定目的在于,使現行規則原則上允許的但卻有害的補貼類型服從更嚴格的規則。例如,可以通過擴大禁止補貼的名單,或者創建一種可反駁的關于嚴重損害的假設,類似于《SCM協定》中失效的第6(1)條。舉例而言,可能受到如此嚴格規則約束的補貼類型包括:無限制的擔保,對沒有可靠的重組計劃或雙重定價的資不抵債或陷入困境的企業的補貼。
 
B. Establishingnew rules to address barriers to services and investment, including inthe field of forced technology transfer
制定新規則,解決服務和投資方面的障礙,包括在強制技術轉讓領域
 
Following the Joint Statements agreed in Buenos Aires, work isalready ongoing in the areas of domestic regulation, e-commerce andinvestment facilitation but further efforts will be needed to address gaps andto update the WTO rule book.
 
發布布宜諾斯艾利斯聯合聲明之后,國內監管、電子商務和投資便利化等領域的工作已經在進行,但還需要進一步努力協調差距,并更新世貿組織規則手冊。
 
1. Need to addressmarket access barriers, discriminatory treatment of foreign investors andbehind the border distortions, including as they relate to forced technology transferand other trade distortive policies
 
需要解決市場準入障礙、對外國投資者的歧視性待遇以及其他廣泛存在的扭曲背后的問題,包括與強制技術轉讓和其他貿易扭曲政策有關的問題
 
The multilateral rule-book on investment, whether inservices or other sectors of the economy, needs to be updated. The GATS covers investment in thearea of services via Mode 3. Nonetheless, many WTO Members still maintain broad reservations orexclusions. Sectors outside of services (such as investment in manufacturing or mining) are notcovered (althoughservices incidental to mining and incidental to manufacturing are covered). The TRIMSonly contains a limited set of disciplines relating to discriminatorymeasures/quantitative restrictions regarding trade in goods.
 
需要更新關于投資的多邊規則手冊,不論是在服務部門還是在經濟的其他部門。通過模式3,《服務業貿易總協定》(GATS)覆蓋了服務領域的投資。盡管如此,許多WTO成員仍對排斥其他國家對許多領域的投資。服務業以外的部門(如制造業或采礦業的投資)不包括在內(盡管礦業附帶的服務和制造業附帶的服務也包括在內)?!杜c貿易有關的投資措施》(TRIMS)只包含有限的有關商品貿易歧視措施/數量限制的項目。
 
Forced technology transfer, where foreignoperators are directly or indirectly forced to share their innovation andtechnology with the state or with domestic operators, has emerged asa major trade irritant. There are a number of provisions in the current WTOrule book in GATT, GATS, TRIMS andTRIPS, that shouldhelp to address forced technology transfers. However, the scope ofapplication of these provisions (including in terms of commitments taken by the parties) is limited andtherefore insufficient to address some of the most important sources ofproblems such as requirements prohibiting or limiting foreign ownership (e.g. jointventure requirements or foreign equity limitations). New rules arealso needed to address administrative review and licensing processes based onunclear rules, and processesallowing for wide discretion (e.g. marketing approvals) as well as licensing restrictions (where foreigninvestors are limited in setting market-based terms when negotiating theirtechnology licensing agreements). Certain rules in areas such as trade secrets shouldalso be reinforced, notably as regards enforcement. For example, investors arefaced with difficulties to get effective protection before the administrationand courts against unfair commercial use and unauthorised disclosure of tradesecrets.
 
強制性技術轉讓(即外國運營商直接或間接地被迫與國家或國內運營商分享他們的創新和技術)已成為一個主要的貿易障礙。在現行的《關貿總協定》、《總協定》、《貿易和投資協定》和《與貿易有關的知識產權協議》的WTO規則手冊中,有一些條款本應該有助于解決強制技術轉讓問題。但是,這些規定的適用范圍(包括締約方作出的承諾)是有限的,因此不足以解決某些最重要的問題,例如禁止或限制外國所有權的規定(例如合資企業規定或外國股權限制)。還需要制定新規則,以解決基于不明確規則的行政審查和許可程序,以及允許廣泛自由裁量權的程序(如市場許可)和許可限制(外國投資者在談判技術許可協議時,在設定基于市場的條款方面受到限制)。商業機密等領域的某些規則也應該加強,尤其是在執行方面。例如,投資者很難在政府和法院得到有效的保護,以防出現不公平地利用或未經授權而披露商業機密的行為。
 
Thus, besides the specific rules to address forcedtechnology transfers, the EU should propose new rules that would complementthe existing disciplines. The new rules would introduce disciplines that wouldenable us to improve overall market access conditions for foreign directinvestment (both in theservices and non-services sectors) as well as address distortive and discriminatorypractices including legal form restrictions and performance requirements (such as thesourcing or production of goods or services locally) in a morecomprehensive manner.
 
因此,除了針對強制技術轉讓的具體規則外,歐盟還應提出新的規則,以補充現有規則。新規則需引入一些條款,以一種更綜合的方式,提高外商直接投資(包括服務和非服務部門)的整體市場準入條件,解決扭曲和歧視性做法,包括法律限制和經營要求(例如在本地采購或生產貨物或服務)。
 
There is also a clear need to address behind the borderdiscriminatory practices by reinforcing national treatment obligations anddeveloping strong domestic regulation disciplines ensuring non-discriminatoryand transparent regulatory and enforcement processes in the services andnon-services sectors.
 
此外,還需要通過加強國民待遇義務和發展強有力的國內監管紀律,以確保服務業和非服務業的非歧視性和透明性的監管和執法過程,來解決國別歧視行為背后的問題。
 
2. Need to addressbarriers to digital trade
需要解決數字貿易的障礙
 
Digital trade, or trade enabled by electronic means, is nowadayspervasive throughout the economy, covering both trade in services and in goods andenabling transactions performed completely online as well as facilitatingphysical transactions. As a consequence, establishing disciplines covering digital trade isimportant to remove unjustified barriers to trade by electronic means, to bring legalcertainly for companies, and to ensure a secure online environment forconsumers. Crucially, there are important cross-linkages to addressingforced technology transfers (such as disclosure of source code requirements). Again, newdisciplines should cover not only trade in services, but apply toall economic sectors.
 
數字貿易,或通過電子手段進行的貿易,如今已遍及整個經濟領域,既包括服務貿易,也包括商品貿易,使完全的線上交易和線下實物交易均成為可能。因此,建立涵蓋數字貿易的規則,對于通過電子手段消除不合理的貿易壁壘,為企業營造合法經營的環境,確保消費者擁有安全的網絡環境,都非常重要。至關重要的是,在解決強制技術轉讓(如披露源代碼的要求)方面存在重要的交叉聯系。此外,新的規則不僅要包括服務貿易,而且要適用于所有經濟部門。
 
C.Addressing the sustainability objectives of the globalcommunity
解決全球社會的可持續性目標
 
Finally, it is crucial to bring the WTO and its trade agendacloser to citizens and ensure that trade contributes to the pursuit of broaderobjectives set by the global community, in particular as regards sustainability. TheSustainable Development Goals agreed by the world’s leaders in 2015 already setout a detailed set of actions that need to be pursued, many of themwith strong links to trade.
 
最后,至關重要的是使世貿組織及其貿易議程更是公民友好型的,并確保貿易有助于實現國際社會確定的更廣泛目標,特別是在可持續性方面。2015年,世界各國領導人達成的可持續發展目標已經制定了一系列需要實施的具體行動,其中許多與貿易有著密切聯系。
 
At the current moment, the only SDG issues that is actively being negotiatedin the WTO is the elimination of the most harmful fisheries subsidies, which ishowever also an area of negotiations clearly mandated by the Doha Declaration.More can and should be done by the trade community.
 
目前,世貿組織正在積極談判的唯一可持續發展目標問題是消除最有害的漁業補貼,但這也是多哈宣言明確授權的談判領域。貿易界可以而且應該做更多的事情。
 
Consequently, the EU should over the coming months prepare adetailed analysis of the SDG targets and identify ways in which trade policy couldcontribute to achieving them. The EU should then together with other Membersactively pursue putting forward these issues for exploration and discussion inthe WTO.
 
因此,歐盟應在未來幾個月對可持續發展目標進行詳細分析,并確定貿易政策有助于實現這些目標的方式。歐盟應與其他成員國一道,積極尋求提出這些問題,以供世貿組織探討和探討。
 
(二)Proposals for a new approach toflexibilities in the context of development objectives
關于在發展目標的范圍內采用更靈活的新方法的建議
 
The WTO was founded with development at its centre, underpinned bythe fact that free rules-based trade contributes to growth and development. However, the currentdebate promotes the view that global trade rules are somehow an impediment todevelopment and therefore that developing countries need to be exempt fromcurrent and future rules;in fact the opposite is true. The current distinction betweendeveloped and developing countries, which allows no nuance, no longer reflects the reality of the rapid economicgrowth in some developing countries. The result is that the developing countrygroup now includes some of the world's top trading nations, who havesignificant economic differences from other members of this group and who insome cases even present a level of development which surpasses that of certainMembers who are designated as developed in the organisation. This lack ofnuance and its consequences with regard to the special and differentialtreatment question has been a major source of tensions in the WTO and anobstacle to the progress of negotiations:the demand for blanket flexibilities for two thirds of the WTOmembership dilutes the call from those countries that have evident needs fordevelopment assistance, leads to much weaker ambition in negotiations and isused as a tool to block progress in, or even at the beginning of, negotiations.
 
世界貿易組織的核心任務是促進發展,其理論基礎是基于規則的自由貿易有助于增長和發展。然而,目前的辯論促成了這樣一種觀點,即在某種程度上,全球貿易規則阻礙了發展。因此,發展中國家需要免受現行和未來規則的約束;事實恰好相反?,F有規則定義的發達國家和發展中國家之間的差別,已不再反映一些發展中國家經濟迅速增長的現實。結果就是,發展中國家現在包括一些世界上最大的貿易國家,它們與這個群體的其他成員有顯著的經濟差異,甚至在某些方面,它們的發展水平甚至要超過被某些發達國家。這個問題的一直是世貿組織緊張局勢的主要根源:對WTO三分之二成員國實行全面靈活性的要求,沖淡了那些明顯需要發展援助的國家的呼聲,這些國家在談判中的雄心要弱得多,并容易被用作阻礙談判進程的工具,甚至在談判開始時也是如此。
 
The EU fully supports the view that developingcountries should be allowed the assistance and flexibilities they need to meettheir development goals. Nevertheless, change is needed in the organisation regarding howflexibilities are crafted and implemented with a view to ensuring that flexibilitiesare made available to those Members who actually need them. In order to advancethis debate, the EU shouldpropose the following:
 
歐盟完全支持這樣一種觀點:應該允許發展中國家獲得滿足其發展目標所需的援助和規則適用的彈性。然而,WTO需要改變規則彈性的制定方式和實施方式,以確保夠提供給那些真正需要的成員。為了推進這一辯論,歐盟應提出以下建議:
 
1. Graduation:Members should be actively encouraged to "graduate" andopt-out of SDT, whether horizontally or agreement by agreement.In the interim, Members shouldbe encouraged to clarify in which areas they actually use existingflexibilities and to present roadmaps detailing when they would expect to beable to assume all the obligations stemming from the WTO agreement. This couldform an integral part of a Member's TPR process.
 
“畢業”程序:應積極鼓勵成員“畢業”并選擇退出特別和差別待遇,不論是整體的還是單個協議的。在此期間,應鼓勵各成員國澄清它們在哪些領域仍然在利用政策給予的彈性,并提出詳細的路線圖,說明它們預計何時能夠承擔世貿組織協定所規定的所有義務。這可以成為對成員貿易政策評估過程的一個組成部分。
 
2. Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) in futureagreements:while acknowledging the need forparticularly flexible treatment of LDCs, flexibilities available to other Members should move awayfrom open-ended block exemptions toward a needs-driven and evidence-basedapproach that will ensure that SDT will be as targeted as possible. Variousapproaches can be used, which should satisfy the following principles:
 
今后各項協定中的特別和差別待遇:在承認需要特別靈活地對待最不發達國家的同時,其他成員所具有的彈性應從不限成員名額的集體豁免轉向以需求為導向和以證據為基礎的辦法,以確保其針對最不發達國家??梢圆捎枚喾N方法,滿足以下原則:
 
(1)the agreement in question will eventually be universallyimplemented, so that thecore rights and obligations will apply to everyone and any exceptions will betime-bound;
 
該協議最終將得到普遍執行,核心權利和義務將適用于所有人,任何例外都將有時間限制;
 
(2)in-built flexibility in the form of additional commitments going beyond acore set of provisions should cater for differences among Members
附加的靈活性,即超出核心規定范圍的額外承諾,應照顧到成員之間的差異
 
(3)the flexibilities available in any agreement should be proportionalto the number of Members participating and the ambition of the agreement.
任何協議中的靈活性都應與參與協議的成員數量和協議的愿景成正比。
 
There are a number of tools that can be used toimplement these proposals, for example, differentiation, graduation mechanisms, grace periods and assistance linked to implementation.
 
有許多工具可用于推行這些建議,例如執行過程中的差別化處理、“畢業”機制、寬限期和援助。
 
3. Additional SDT in existing agreements:Though existing SDT provisions incurrent agreements should not be contested, when Membersrequest additional SDT this should be done only on the basis of a case-by-caseanalysis, on the basisof:
 
現有協定中附加的特殊和差別待遇:雖然現有協定中的特殊與差別待遇規定毋庸置疑,但當成員要求額外的特別待遇時,應僅在個案分析的基礎上,基于以下理由進行評估:
 
(1)a clear identification of the development objectivethat is being affected by the rule in question;
明確確定受到有關規則影響的發展目標;
 
(2)an economicanalysis of the impact of the rule and of the expected benefits of itsrelaxation;
對該規則的影響及其放寬后的預期效益進行經濟分析;
 
(3)an analysis of the impact of the requested flexibilityon other WTO Members;
分析額外增加的靈活性對WTO其他成員的影響;
 
(4)a specification of the time period for whichflexibility is requested and of its scope of application (one Member, a group ofMembers or all developing country Members).
 
明確靈活性適用的時間段和適用范圍(一個成員、一組成員或所有發展中國家成員)。
 
Depending onthe outcome of this analysis, various approaches can be used to consider additionalflexibilities.
 
根據分析的結果,可以使用各種方法來考慮額外的靈活性。
 
(三)Proposals to strengthen theprocedural aspects of the WTO’s rulemaking activities
關于加強WTO規則制定程序方面的建議
 
The blockage of the WTO’s negotiating function confirmsthe need for flexibility in terms of negotiating approaches. This reflects theconcept of flexible multilateralism, where Members interested in pursuing a certain issuewhich is not yet ready for a full multilateral consensus, should be ableto advance the issue and reach an agreement if its benefits are made availableto all other Members on an MFN basis. However, other ideas should be explored as well with a view tostrengthening the negotiating function and helping build political engagementand support for multilateral negotiations.
 
世貿組織談判職能的不良發揮,證實了談判方式需要靈活性。這反映了靈活的多邊主義的概念,在這個概念中,如果在最惠國待遇的基礎上對其他所有成員都有益,那么,有興趣尋求一個尚未準備充分達成多邊一致意見的問題的成員應該能夠推動這一問題并達成協議。但是,還應探討其他想法,以期強化談判職能,幫助建立政治參與和支持多邊談判。
 
In this regard, the EU shouldpursue the following issues:
為此,歐盟應繼續探討以下問題:
 
Multilateralnegotiations: Maintain support for full multilateral negotiations andoutcomes in areas where this is possible.
多邊談判:在可能的范圍內,支持全面的多邊談判和及其達成的協議。
 
Plurilateralnegotiations: In areas where multilateral consensusis unattainable, actively support and pursue plurilateral negotiationswhich should remain open to all Members to join and whose results will beapplied on an MFN basis. Explore the feasibility of amending the WTO agreementso as to create a new Annex IV.b. which would contain a set of plurilateralagreements that are applied on an MFN-basis and which could be amended througha simplified process.
 
有限多邊談判:在無法達成多邊協商一致意見的領域,積極支持和進行有限多邊談判,這些談判應繼續向所有成員國開放,其結果將在最惠國待遇的基礎上得到應用。探討修改《WTO協定》的可行性,以創建一個全新的協議,它將包括一套在最惠國待遇基礎上適用的有限多邊協定,這些協定可以通過簡化程序加以修訂。
 
Role of thesecretariat: the EU should put forward a proposal for a MinisterialDecision which strengthens the role of the WTO Secretariat in support ofvarious negotiating processes as well as in the implementation and monitoringfunctions.
 
秘書處的作用:歐盟應提出一項關于部長決定的建議,以加強世貿組織秘書處在支持各種談判進程以及執行和監測職能方面的作用。
 
Buildingpolitical support: the EU should explore with other Members possible waysof building greater political support and engagement in the WTO, includingpossible options as to the frequency of Ministerial Conferences as well as waysof intensifying Senior Officials processes.
 
建立政治支持:歐盟應與其他成員國探討在WTO中獲得更大政治支持和參與的可能途徑,包括部長級會議頻率的可能選擇,以及強化高級官員程序的方式。


三、關于常規工作和透明度的建議


Background/背景
 
The European Council of 28-29 June 2018 gave theCommission a mandate to pursue WTO modernisation in pursuit of the objectivesof (1) making the WTOmore relevant and adaptive to a changing world, and (2) strengthening the WTO's effectiveness. Making theWTO’s regular work and monitoring function more effective is a key component ofthis process.
 
2018年6月28日至29日,歐洲理事會授權歐盟委員會實施世貿組織現代化計劃,以實現以下目標:(1)提高世貿組織對變化中的世界的適應性和相關;(2)增強世貿組織的有效性。這一進程的關鍵組成部分,是使世貿組織的常規工作和監督職能更加有效。
 
Broader contextand the focus of EU efforts
大背景和歐盟努力的重點
 
With its negotiating function paralysed and its disputesettlement system challenged, the WTO post-MC11 is in an existential struggle toremain a credible basis for trade relationships. The so-called regular work inthe WTO's councils and committees – i.e. the work that is neither related tonegotiations nor dispute settlement – can be such a basis to some extent anddoes useful work, but itspotential is generally underutilised. Making this regular work respond moreeffectively and efficiently to the real interests of stakeholders would helpkeep the WTO relevant at a time where solutions to the negotiating and disputesettlement functions are being sought.
 
由于談判功能癱瘓和爭端解決機制面臨的挑戰,世貿組織在第十一屆部長會議結束后,正處在一場事關存亡的努力之中,目的是想保持其作為貿易關系可信性的基礎地位。世貿組織理事會和委員會中所謂的常規性工作——即既不涉及談判也不涉及解決爭端的工作——在某種程度上可以作為這一基礎,并能發揮有益的作用,但其潛力沒有得到充分利用。使這一常規性工作更有效地響應利益攸關方的真正利益,將有助于解決談判和爭端解決職能的同時,保持世貿組織的相關性。
 
Overallobjective for modernization
現代化的整體目標
 
The long-term objective is to enable the WTO to achievemore concrete results in terms of i) ensuring transparency about Members' trade measures, ii) solvingspecific trade concerns before they get to litigation state and iii) incrementallyadjusting the WTO rulebook, where necessary.
 
長期目標是使世貿組織在以下方面取得更具體的成果:1)確保成員國貿易措施的透明度;2)在成員國進入訴訟狀態之前解決具體的貿易問題;
 
Futureproposals/未來的建議
 
A.Transparencyand notifications
透明性和通知
 
A fundamental task of the WTO is to monitor whetherMembers implement the WTO agreements properly and whether they make their tradepolicies transparent by following WTO notification rules. This monitoring isdone in the regular WTO councils and committees as well as the Trade PolicyReview Body.
 
世貿組織的一項根本任務是監督各成員國是否正確執行世貿組織協定,以及它們是否按照世貿組織通知規則,使其貿易政策透明化。這種監測是在世貿組織的定期理事會和委員會以及貿易政策審查機構中進行的。
 
While the EU invests significant resources to makecomplete and timely notifications, several of our top trading partners do not complysufficiently with notification obligations. As a result, their tradepractices remain opaque, which makes it impossible to monitor compliance withWTO rules and seek their enforcement. Where EU firms cannot get the informationon how to access markets, they cannot compete with domestic firms on an equalfooting. In order to remedy this long-standing problem, the EUproposes to improve or establish the following practices regardingnotifications:
 
盡管歐盟投入了大量資源來推動通知的及時性,但我們的幾個主要貿易伙伴卻沒有充分履行該義務。因此,它們的貿易實踐仍然不透明,這使得WTO不可能監督其遵守世貿組織規則的情況,也無法尋求實施這些規則。在歐盟企業無法獲取如何進入市場的信息的國家(或地區),它們也無法在平等的基礎上與國內企業競爭。為了解決這個長期存在的問題,歐盟建議改進或建立以下關于通知的做法:
 
1. More effectivecommittee-level monitoring:All committees overseeing WTO agreements with notificationobligations regularly review individual notifications and Members' generalperformance. These reviews, however, are not effective enough in closing gaps, partly becausethe Secretariat is not allowed to make qualitative assessments and Members arenot held accountable to explain the reasons for their underperformance. Thegaps are of particular concern in the area of trade in goods.
 
更有效的委員會級別的監督:所有具有監督WTO協議通知義務的委員會定期審查個別通知和成員的總體表現。然而,這些審查在縮小差距方面不夠有效,部分原因是不允許秘書處評估其質量,而且成員也沒有責任解釋其業績不佳的原因。這些差距在貨物貿易領域特別令人關注。
 
As a first step,the EU proposes that each committee overseeingnotification obligations on trade in goods explores, under theoversight of the Council for Trade in Goods, how to make notification reviews more effective andinteractive, e.g. by i) introducing arequirement for Members to explain reasons for delays and provide a substantivereply to comments;ii) allowing theSecretariat to make more qualitative assessments both on notifications and onreplies to comments received;iii) publishing both comments on notifications and repliesthereto on a single, public database managed by the WTO;and iv) puttingnon-compliant Members more on the spot in meetings as well as written reports.?
 
第一步,歐盟建議,在貨物貿易委員會的監督下,監督貨物貿易通知義務的各委員會探討如何使通知審查制度更有效和更具互動性,例如:i)規定委員須解釋延誤的原因,并對意見作出實質的回應;ii)允許秘書處對所收到的通知和答復作出更實質性的評價;iii)在世貿組織管理的單一公共數據庫上發表關于通知和答復的評論;iv)在會議和書面報告中,增加對不遵守規則的成員的曝光。

2. Incentivesfor improving notification compliance:The EU acknowledges that numerous WTO Members, particularlysmall developing countries, have limited resources for meeting notificationobligations and deadlines. While acknowledging these constraints, it should beborne in mind that notifications form a central part of the monitoringprocesses of the WTO and may provide advantages to the notifying Member itselfas it may contribute to stimulating reflection about administrative coherencedomestically. Significant resources already exist for assisting Members whoexperience capacity constraints to meet their notification obligations, including inthe form of WTO technical assistance.
 
改善遵守通知規則的激勵措施:歐盟承認,許多世貿組織成員國,特別是小的發展中國家,在履行通知義務和期限方面的資源有限。在承認這些限制的同時,應當記住,通知是世界貿易組織監管過程的中心部分,對通知成員本身有利,因為它可能有助于促進國內對執政連貫性的思考。已有大量資源用于協助能力受到限制的成員履行其通知義務,包括以世貿組織技術援助的形式。
 
The EU proposes to examine, together withother WTO Members and the WTO Secretariat, whether improvements in the provision of assistanceare necessary. The EU also encourages making more use of workshops anddedicated informal discussions at committee level to share information and bestpractices, and todisseminate the results more widely. Further, improvements in a Member's notification practiceshould be showcased and lauded more in meetings, reports and TPRs.
 
歐盟建議與世貿組織其他成員國和世貿組織秘書處一道審查是否有必要改善提供援助的條件。歐盟還鼓勵更多地利用研討會和專門委員會級別的非正式討論,以分享信息和最佳做法,并更廣泛地傳播討論結果。此外,應在會議、報告和定期報告中更多地展示和表揚會員國對通知實踐的改進。
 
3. Sanctionsfor wilful and repeated non-compliance:A distinction needs to be drawn between, on the onehand, lack ofcapacity to prepare notifications and missing deadlines for a justifiablereason and, on the otherhand, systematicobfuscation. The latter is a serious breach of the spirit and rules of themultilateral trading system but, at present, has no consequence for the Member in breach beyondbeing exposed to complaints by others.
 
對故意和重復不遵守規定的制裁:一方面,需要區分缺乏準備通知的能力和出于正當理由錯過最后期限的情況,另一方面,要厘清系統性偏差。后者嚴重違反了多邊貿易制度的精神和規則,但目前對違反這一制度的成員來說,除了受到其他國家的控訴外,沒有任何后果。
 
The EU considers that instruments are needed to enforcenotification compliance where?capacity constraints are not the issue and proposes towork with other WTO Members, including the United States who recently made aproposal in this regard, on developing sanctions which are effective, fair andcommensurate. Such sanctions could include, inter alia, exposing non-compliant Members to stronger criticismat a political level and in public and limiting certain rights related toparticipation in WTO proceedings (e.g. chairing WTO bodies, seeking replies from other Members).
 
歐盟認為,在不存在能力限制的情況下,需要有文書來執行遵守通知的規定,并建議與世貿組織其他成員國合作,包括美國在內。美國最近在這方面提出了一項建議,要求制定有效、公平和相稱的制裁措施。除其他制裁外,還包括在政治層面和公共層面,使不遵守規則的成員受到更強烈的批評,并限制參與世貿組織訴訟的某些權利(例如,擔任世貿組織各機構的主席,尋求其他成員的答復)。
 
4. Counter-notifications, i.e.notifications made by a Member on behalf of another, are apotentially powerful instrument available in various agreements. They are, however, hardly used, partly becausepreparing them requires a significant amount of research and intelligence.
 
反通知,即一個成員代表另一個成員發出的通知,是各種協議中可能具有強大效力的工具。然而,它們很少被使用,部分原因是準備它們需要大量的研究和智慧。
 
The EU proposes to i) cooperate more with like-minded Members in preparingjoint counter-notifications, ii) explore how the WTO Secretariat could be involved more, whilstguarding its neutrality towards Members, and iii) strengthen the consequences of a Member being subjectto a counter-notification.
 
歐盟建議:i)與志同道合的成員國加強合作,共同準備反通知;ii)探討WTO秘書處如何能更多地參與,同時保持對成員國的中立;iii)增強成員受到反通知的后果。
 
Strengthening the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM):Even though the TPRM has no mandate to assess Members' compliancewith WTO rules, it is a useful tool for peer pressure. Moreover, the vastamount of information on Members’ trade policy measures which is gathered boththrough the reviews of individual Members and the biannual global trademonitoring reports feeds into the work of other committees. A particular assetis that the Secretariat can do its own research when preparing its reports anduse information from other Members to highlight measures even if they have notbeen notified – provided that the Member under review does not object to thisinformation being included in the report.
 
強化貿易政策審查機制(TPRM):盡管TPRM沒有授權評估成員國遵守世貿組織規則的情況,但它是成員國向其它成員國施加壓力的有用工具。此外,通過對個別成員的審查和半年一次的全球貿易監測報告收集的關于各成員貿易政策措施的大量資料,也有助于其他委員會的工作。一個特別的優點是,秘書處在編寫其報告時可以自己進行研究,并利用其他成員提供的資料來突出各項措施,即使這些措施沒有得到通知——只要所審查的成員不反對將這些資料列入報告。
 
Bearing in mind that improvements to the functioning ofthe TPRM can only be negotiated during an appraisal of the TPRM (the lastappraisal took place in 2016 and there is no date yet for the next one), the EUproposes to increase the effectiveness of the TPR exercise by empowering theSecretariat to go further in assessing notification performance in its reportfor a Member's review. The information on notifications could be expanded intoa separate chapter and made more informative by systematically highlightingqualitative aspects of compliance and describing how the Member's notificationperformance has evolved since the last review.
 
這一點需銘記在心:只有在評估貿易政策審查機制之后,才能對如何改善貿易政策審查機制的運作進行談判(上次的評估是在2016年進行的,下一個評估的日期還沒有確定),歐盟建議通過授權秘書處進一步評估通知執行的情況,以提高貿易政策審查機制工作的有效性。關于通知的信息可以擴大成單獨的一章,并通過系統地介紹實質性遵守規則的表現,以及描述自上次審查以來成員的表現如何演變,而使其內容更加豐富。
 
B.Solving marketaccess problems
 
解決市場準入問題
 
Raising awareness on trade irritants and seekingclarifications from the Member applying them is an essential part of the workof numerous committees. Despite the significant amount of time and resourcesthat the EU and some like-minded Members put into raising these irritants, the outcomesare slim for a number of reasons. Most importantly, not givingsatisfactory replies – or not giving a reply at all – does not have realconsequences for a Member, beyond being put on the spot for the duration of theagenda point. The result is repetitive meetings in which speaking points getrecycled.
 
提高對刺激貿易的方法的認識,并要求使用這些刺激方法的成員對其作出說明,是許多委員會工作的一個重要部分。由于某些原因,盡管歐盟和一些志同道合的成員國投入了大量的時間和資源來評估這些刺激措施,但結果不盡人意。最重要的是,沒有作出令人滿意的答復——或根本沒有作出答復——對一個成員來說,除了被曝光,并沒有其他實質性的后果。其結果是重復的會議,以及這些要點被不斷重復。
 
The EU proposesto make the pre-litigation problem solving of the WTO more effective by:Developing rules that oblige Membersto give substantive replies within specific timeframes to written questions byother Members or to specific trade concerns raised by other Members in aCommittee meeting;and?Strengtheningcross-committee coordination on market access issues (i.e. makingsure that the various measures criticised at CTG level are coherently followedup on in the TRIMS, TBT and Market Access Committee, for example), with the helpof the Secretariat.
 
歐盟建議通過以下方式提高尚未進入WTO訴訟程序的問題的解決效率:制定規則,要求成員國在特定時間內對其他成員國提出的書面問題或其他成員國在委員會會議上提出的具體貿易問題作出實質性答復;在秘書處的幫助下,加強跨委員會在市場準入問題上的協調?例如,確保在CTG層面受到批評的各項措施在《與貿易有關的投資措施》、《技術性貿易壁壘》和市場準入委員會等方面得到持續跟進)。
 
C. Adjusting theWTO rulebook incrementally
 
逐步調整WTO規則手冊
 
The regular WTO councils and committees also have theability to incrementally adjust and clarify the WTO rulebook outside thenegotiations. While there are examples of such incremental adjustments (e.g. thecatalogue of instruments available to manage SPS issues adopted by the SPSCommittee on 2 March 2018, the CTG decision of 2012 on notification proceduresfor quantitative restrictions or the 2000 Decision of the TBT Committee onprinciples for the development of international standards), decisions withreal consequence are rare. Often, the WTO’s ability to adjust its rules throughcommittee work hinges on the mandate of the committee concerned:While some bodies like the TBT andSPS Committees are mandated to further the TBT and SPS Agreements, other bodiesare limited to monitoring and implementing the agreements they oversee.
 
世貿組織理事會和委員會也有能力在談判之外逐步調整和澄清世貿組織規則。雖然曾有這樣的漸進式調整的案例(例如2018年3月2日SPS委員會通過的用于管理SPS問題的工具目錄,2012年CTG關于數量限制通知程序的決定或2000年TBT國際標準發展原則委員會的決定),但關于實際結果的決策卻是罕見的。通常,世貿組織通過委員會的努力調整規則的能力,取決于相關委員會的授權:雖然技術壁壘和SPS委員會等一些機構被授權推進技術壁壘和SPS協議,但其他機構僅限于監督和執行它們監督的協議。
 
More incremental adjustments could help demonstratethat the WTO is able to evolve even though its negotiating function is notdelivering the expected results. The EU proposes to assess, agreement byagreement, whethertargeted proposals could be put forward for advancing WTO rules. Such proposalscould either be topics which were part of the DDA negotiations or new ideas, should reflectthe interests of stakeholders and be able to get traction among WTO Members.
 
更多的漸進式調整可能有助于證明,盡管WTO的談判職能未能實現預期結果,但它仍有能力不斷演化。歐盟建議逐項評估目標建議是否可以被提出,以推進WTO規則。這些提議可以是多哈發展議程談判的一部分,也可以是新的想法,它們應該反映利益攸關方的利益,并能夠在WTO成員國中獲得支持。
 
D.  Downsizing ineffective committees
 
裁減無效的委員會
 
The flipside to investing more resources into the workof some committees would be deactivating those that are running idle. There areseveral bodies which were created to address specific issues of interest to agroup of Members at a particular moment in time, but which proponents no longer feed with input.Deactivating would not necessarily mean shutting these bodies down completely, but puttingthem to rest – like the Working Groups on the Singapore issues. Alternatively, the number ofmeetings could be reduced, as was done in the case of services bodies where onlythe Council for Trade in Services meets regularly whereas its subsidiary bodiesare only convened upon explicit request by a Member.

向某些委員會投入更多資源,也意味著停止運行有些閑置的委員會。有幾個機構是為了在某個特定時刻處理一群成員感興趣的具體問題而設立的,但支持者不再提供新的意見。停止運行這些機構并不一定意味著完全關閉它們,只是讓它們?休息休息???就像新加坡問題工作組那樣。另一種辦法是,降低會議的頻數,就像服務部門的情況那樣,只有服務貿易理事會定期開會,而其附屬機構只有在一個成員明確要求時才開會。



四、關于爭端解決機制的建議


Introduction/引言
 
This paperexamines possible approaches in order to follow up on the European Councilconclusions of 28 June 2018. The European Council underlined, in a contextof growing trade tensions, the importance of preserving and deepening therules-based multilateral system and stated that the EU is committed to workingtowards its modernisation. The European Council invited the Commission topropose a comprehensive approach to improving, together with like-minded partners, thefunctioning of the WTO in crucial areas, including "more effective and transparent disputesettlement, including theAppellate Body, with a view toensuring a level playing field." (paragraph 16 of the conclusions)
 
本文研究了可能的方法,以便對歐洲理事會2018年6月28日的決議采取后續行動。在全球貿易日益緊張的背景下,歐洲理事會強調了維護和深化以規則為基礎的多邊體系的重要性,并表示歐盟應致力于實現其現代化。歐洲理事會(European Council)邀請歐盟委員會(European Commission)提出一項全面方案,與志同道合的伙伴一道,改善世貿組織在關鍵領域的運作,包括“更有效、更透明的爭端解決機制,包括上訴機構,以確保公平的競爭環境”。(結論第16段)
 
Context/背景
 
The disputesettlement function of the WTO is at grave danger, and swift action by Members is needed to preserve it. Ifthe United States' blockage of Appellate Body appointments continues, it willundermine the WTO dispute settlement at the latest by December 2019. At thatpoint in time, there will beless than 3 Appellate Body members left, which is the minimum number required for the AppellateBody to hear an appeal. Without a functioning Appellate Body, any party tothe dispute may attempt to block the adoption of panel rulings (by appealing it), so – if noaction is taken – this may undermine the operation WTO dispute settlement as awhole.
 
世界貿易組織的爭端解決功能處于嚴重危險之中,需要各成員國迅速采取行動來維護它。如果美國繼續阻撓對上訴機構成員的任命,最遲將于2019年12月破壞世貿組織爭端解決機制。屆時,上訴機構成員將不足3人,這是上訴機構聽取訴訟的最少人數。如果沒有一個有效的上訴機構,爭議的任何一方都可能試圖(通過上訴)阻止陪審團裁定的通過。因此,如果不采取行動,這可能會破壞整個WTO爭端解決體系。
 
如何解釋任命受阻?
 
起初,美國阻止任命的原因與“美國政治領導人不斷變化”有關,從2016年8月開始,美國開始關注所謂的上訴審查工作程序第15條的問題。根據這一規定,上訴機構可授權其離任成員完成未決上訴的處理。美國曾在DSB會議上多次表示,它無法支持啟動對新上訴機構成員的遴選程序。它認為,對于不再是上訴機構成員的人發出的報告進行討論,以及決定如何處理,也是DSB的優先事項。此后,美國一再重申,它“仍然堅決認為,各會員國需要把解決這一問題作為優先事項”。
 
一開始時,這似乎是關于任命程序所引起的唯一具體關切,但在最近幾個月,美國也表示了一些其他涉及上訴機構運作的關切。這些關切在解決爭端機構的會議上得到了明顯的闡述。這包括第17.5條所規定的90天期限問題,該問題是美國在2018年6月22日的委員會會議上提出并詳細討論的。美國還關注上訴機構的調查結果,美國認為,這些調查結果對解決爭端沒有必要。
 
總統2018年貿易政策議程最近總結了“美國對世貿組織爭端解決的關切”。其中一些關注點已經在前幾屆美國政府時期提出,其中還有一些問題(比如第15條規則的問題)是新的。
 
本文件列舉了下列“對上訴機構做法的關注的例子:
 
4. 無視90天上訴期限:美國實質上是在批評AB不尊重DSU第17.5條,根據這條,“在任何情況下,訴訟程序都不應超過90天”。在美國看來,這引發了對透明度、與“迅速解決爭端”不一致,以及90天后報告有效性的不確定性的擔憂。
 
2. 由不再是上訴機構成員的人繼續提供服務:美國聲稱,上訴機構“無權將非上訴機構成員視為成員”。美國認為,是爭端解決機構,而不是上訴機構,有權力和責任決定任用期滿的人是否應繼續任職。
 
3. 對不需要解決爭議的問題發表咨詢意見:美國指出,“世貿組織的報告有一種傾向,它使調查結果對于解決爭端而言是不必要的,或是針對爭端中未出現的問題而提出的”。他們特別指出“一個令人震驚的例子”——“上訴機構的超過三分之二的分析——46頁——本質上是只是附帶說明”。
 
4. 上訴機構對事實和成員國國內法的審查:美國批評了上訴機構審查事實的方式。根據DSU第17.6條,上訴僅限于“小組報告所涵蓋的法律問題和小組制定的法律解釋條例”。然而,美國認為,上訴機構“一貫按照不同的法律標準審查調查結果,所得出的結論并非基于小組事實調查結果或無可爭議的事實”。美國認為,上訴機構審查小組關于國內立法的含義(這應該是一個事實問題)的調查結果的情況更是如此。
 
5. 上訴機構聲稱其報告有權被視為判例:美國聲稱,上訴機構聲稱其報告有效地充當了判例,以及專家組遵循此前缺乏“有力理由”的上訴機構報告,在世貿組織規則中沒有任何依據。美國提出,“盡管上訴機構報告可以對涉及的協議提供有價值的說明,但上訴機構報告本身并不是一致同意的文本,也不能替代經過談判和商定而成的文本?!?/div>
 
此外,美國對上訴機構在各種爭端中“增加或減少權利和義務”提出了更實質性的關切。具體而言,上訴機構對下列問題的裁決就證明了這一點:對《補貼協定》下的“公共機構”概念的解釋、對《技術性貿易壁壘協定》第2.1條下的非歧視性義務的解釋、關于保障措施的某些解釋(特別是關于“未預見的事態發展”),歐盟對伯德修正案(將反傾銷/反補貼稅所得給予美國工業)和“外國銷售公司”(被視為出口補貼)稅收待遇提起訴訟的結果。美國認為,這些爭端的調查結果與談判達成的有關世貿組織協定不符。
 
EU position/歐盟的立場
 
針對美國提出的關切是否有充分根據,歐盟持不偏不倚的立場。在此前提下,為保留并進一步增強其主要特點和原則的同時,本文探討了處理這些關切,并以此改進WTO體制的途徑,同時。
 
為了平衡各方訴求,本文還探討了其他可能的改進路徑。特別是2016年,在美國否決重新任命一名新的上訴機構成員后,人們普遍認為,為了保持上訴機構成員的獨立性和公正性,需要系統性的解決方案。
 
這些不同的解決方案應該被看作是一個整體的各個部分。特別是強化上訴機構及其成員的獨立性,使它們能夠為與世貿組織成員的互動引入一種額外的機制,而不必擔心這種互動會過分影響它們的決定。
 
Futureproposals/未來的建議
  
歐盟應提出一項全面的建議,以解決世貿組織成員反對上訴機構任命的問題,這可能改善該制度的運作,同時保留和進一步加強世貿組織爭端解決制度的主要特點和原則。這項建議——在第一階段中——旨在提高程序的效率,為上訴機構和世貿組織成員之間更好的互動創造條件,同時加強上訴機構的獨立性。在第二階段,將討論有關實施世貿組織規則的實質性問題。
 
第一階段:全面修訂與上訴機構運行有關的爭端解決機制的規定,處理與上訴機構的“方法”有關的所有相關事項
  
本修正案包括下列內容。這些內容還需要進行更深入的反思,以確定這些修正案的確切范圍和性質:
 
爭端解決機制第17.5條及90天期限的問題:通過提高上訴機構的透明度和協商義務,改變爭端解決機制第17.5條中的90天規則。特別地,17.5條可以修正為:“在任何情況下,訴訟程序不得超過90天,除非當事各方一致同意”。
 
如果上訴機構估計報告將在90天時限之外完成,則在上訴程序早期階段(甚至在上訴提出之前)就需要與各方進行協商。如果當事各方沒有就超過這一時限達成協議,應該存在某種機制,根據這種機制,可以對個別上訴的程序或工作安排加以調整,以確保90天的會議時間。

此外,下列變動將對上訴審查的時限產生積極影響:將上訴機構成員數量由7名增至9名。這將有助于提高上訴機構的效率,同時,在重要成員加入后,還可改善上訴機構的地域平衡。此外,上訴機構的內部組織也可以得到改善(例如,三名成員組成的三個司可隨時聽取上訴,而這些司的成員數目不會有重疊)。
 
上訴機構成員的交接規則:將第15(或類似)條編入爭端解決機制,以解決美國對該規則未獲世貿組織成員批準的擔憂。例如,爭端解決機制可以規定,即將離任的上訴機構成員應處理完該成員任期內已經舉行聽證會的未決上訴。
 
對解決爭端沒有必要調查結果:修正爭端解決機制第17.12條,根據該條,上訴機構應就上訴“處理所提出的每一個問題”。例如,可以加上“在解決爭端所必需的程度上”。這將解決人們對上訴機構發表冗長的“咨詢意見”的擔憂,也間接地解決了與第17.5條有關的關切(90天)。
 
作為事實問題的市政法律的含義:可以澄清的是,“專家組報告中涉及的法律問題和專家組制定的法律解釋”并不包括市政措施的含義(盡管它們確實包括,而且應該包括世貿組織法律規定的法律特征)。為此目的,可以在該部第17.6條“為了更確定的[…]”中加一個腳注。

判例的問題:為上訴機構與世貿組織成員定期交換意見提供機會(例如每年舉行的會議),并在條例第17.14條賦予成員權利的基礎上,就通過后上訴機構的報告發表意見。這將提供一個額外的“溝通渠道”,可以表達對某些上訴機構行事方式和方法的關切(例如,將以前的裁決視為先例,而不考慮判例法的演變)。為了避免對上訴機構成員施加不適當的壓力,還可以為此類會議設定適當的透明度和“基本規則”。
 
上訴機構成員的獨立性:為上訴機構成員提供一個單一,但較長(6-8年)的任期。這將解決歐盟(以及世貿組織絕大多數成員國)對上訴機構獨立性的關切。它還將提高上訴機構的效率(一個人的任期的長短是肯定的,而更長的任期將使他從工作經驗中獲益)。
 
第二階段:處理實質性問題

如上所述,美國對上訴機構(“越權”)所作的解釋提出異議,尤其,但不完全是在貿易保護領域。在不損害歐盟對上訴機構所謂“越權”的立場的情況下,有人指出,世貿組織成員國可以根據有關程序修改或解釋實質性規則。在第二階段,一旦阻止上訴機構成員的任命程序被解除,WTO成員就會就這些可能的變化或權威解釋進行討論。
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